Far right, which also be known as the extreme right or radical right, has been defined by various scholars and authors in various ways. Despite argument over the exact definition, far right is generally defined as an extremism of right-wing politics. According to Mudde’s work, the ideology of far right (2002 10-11), Hartmann defines far right as a collective term for all ‘progress-hostile forces’. However, there are objections to this restricted definition since this definition illustrates far right parties as single-issue movements, and conceals other important features of far right ideology.
Most scholars and authors define far right as a political ideology which based on a combination of prominent features, consisting of Supremacism, Authoritarianism, Racism, and extreme-Nationalism. For examples, Macridis defines far-right as ‘an ideology that revolves around the same old staples, such as, racism, xenophobia, and nationalism’. Backes and Jesse defines far right as ‘a collective term for anti-democratic dispositions and attempts, that are traditionally positioned at the extreme ‘right’ of the left-right spectre’ (Mudde 2002: 10-11)Whereas, Falter and Schumann prescribes a set of core ideas of far-right ideology including, ‘extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, anti-parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, a demand for a strong political leader and/or executive, anti-Americanism and cultural pessimism'(Falter 1988: 101)Obviously, these definitions of far right reflect the existence of sharing of some core ideas among far-right, traditionalism, andconservatism through historical and ideological connection.
Old Radical Right had been constituted in France after the French Revolution in 1789 as the main ideology among those supporters for counter-revolution who refused to accept the new republic regime and aimed for restoration of the French monarchy and aristocracy. The rise of radical right parties in Europe such as Nazi Party in Germany and Fascist Party in Italy before 1945 could be seen as the prosperity of old radical right. The old radical right commonly based on various hostile ideas towards Liberalism, Parliamentarism, Sentimism, Communism, Capitalism, and Bourgeois. All of these ideas had been resisted and insulted by radical right parties in the past. Together with the outbreak of Nationalism since the 1930s, far right parties could gained outgrowth from this nationalism and gained more popularity which had given compatibility for these parties to challenge existing states and accounted for much of the aggressive expansionist policy of some fascist regimes (Guibernau 2010: 9) especially, in the period since 1930s until the end of World War II.
New Radical Right
Mainstream political parties consider the new radical right as “fascist” parties that have no legitimacy. If we contemplate the fascist regimes of the 1922 – 1945, we will see a movement. According to Linz’s perspective, traditional fascist can be defined as anti-liberalism, anti-parliamentarism, anti-Semitism, anticommunism. In contrast, despite their standpoint is strongly anti-establishment, the new radical right accepts the rules of parliamentary democracy. New Radical Rights oppose the corporatist and state-controlled economies defined by a strongly hierarchical political leadership but the radical right support a small government. The new radical right accepts market capitalism; however, one of its main ideological weaknesses are the inadequacy of an alternative economic programme like the mainstream political parties. New Radical Rights has their standpoint as anti-globalisation stand but the new radical right uses the means and new technological advances at the core of globalisation in order to promote its movement not only within but also across national boundaries.
The main pillars of the new radical right’s discourse
New radical right’s discourse consists of a high resistance to the existing establishment and a commitment to democratic reform, an explicit anti-immigrant narrative, and high emphasis on protecting western values and the national preference principle.
Anti-establishment and democratic reform
Although its extremely critical view of the functioning of liberal democratic systems, the new radical right does not support their replacement of liberal democratic system by some kind of fascist style political system. In contrary, the new radical right stands advocating a radical regeneration of democracy. In this perspective it is referred to as a promoter of “hyper democracy”. The new radical right’s doctrine concern with a claim for genuinely popular participation and representation by means of radical reform of the established political institutions and the whole political process. In the same line, it defends the use of referendums and open lists in elections. According to Margaret Canovan perspective, the new radical right seeks to undermine and degenerate issues that associated with the political establishment, for example immigration policies, multiculturalism, affirmative action and political correctness.
There are fear and resentment towards immigrants and refugees that have been growing within western societies. The large influx of refugees from Eastern Europe and Africa into European countries in the 1990s gave the rise of issue “invasion of the poor” and it was expressed as the “storming of Europe”. There are a number of economic, social, political and cultural arguments which have been developed to create the legitimacy as a negative attitude towards immigrants. These come from the downward pressure that migrants push on wages and rising unemployment among the native population, to their comparatively high birth rates with potential detrimental implications for the existing welfare system, demographic developments, and national identity. Anti-immigrant sentiment open hostility towards immigrants. It can extend to describe radical right-wing parties do not have their standpoint against all migration but extremely against those immigrants who will pose a cultural threat to western values and national identity and culture.
In present, there are the wave of Islamophobia generated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, Muslims are recognized as posing the most serious threat to western civilization and are often portrayed as the most “alien” and difficult to assimilate. The radical right regards the growing number of Muslims settling in Europe as a severe danger to western culture and values. In European countries, mainstream political parties are enthusiastic to deserve electoral support from ethnic communities of immigrant origin entitled to vote, in particular where such communities are of sizeable dimensions. This is a factor which is also regarded with suspicion and resented by the new radical right, which expresses skepticism at the idea that immigrants and refugees could make any valuable contribution to their society. The rise of the new radical right cannot be described by looking exclusively at economic factors, it seems safe to say that the global economic downturn has stressed the economic as well as the political and cultural concerns that drive people toward the new radical right. In times of crisis minorities receive a severe treatment. They are criticized for the misfortunes affecting the overall society. They are considered guilty because of their supposed “inefficiency”, “laziness”, and “lack of culture”, “susceptibility to crime”, “arrogance” or “economic success”.
Western values and the national preference principle
The new radical right advocates the preservation of western values, a principle that is
often turned into a call for “national preferences”; that is, citizens should enjoy priority access to social welfare and to the protection of their own culture and language, compared to foreigners. Citizenship should determine a sharp boundary between those who belong and those who do not, and the latter should be excluded from the social, economic and political rights associated with it. The principle of national preference mingled with hostility toward those considered too different in terms of values, culture, and often skin-colour should be considered as part and parcel of a project of white resistance or cultural nativism destined to protect what is described as an endangered European identity. The new radical right exhibits a cultural nativism tinted with populist overtones that connects with the dream of a “white Europe”. It is very important to highlight the transnational character of this populist nativism that reaches beyond nationalism by defending the cultural preservation of the European culture. The new radical right presents itself as an alternative to traditional political parties and founds its discourse on a critique of democracy, a protest against elites and a concern about the cultural preservation and integrity of national identity comprehend as part and parcel of European identity.
Integration and ethnopluralism
New radical rights concerns about the preservation of national identity and the nation. It leads to the new radical right to oppose multiculturalism, which, in their view, promotes the destruction of individual cultures. In Western Europe, the new radical right has reacted to this by promoting an organic conception of the nation, which regards “foreign bodies” as a threat to a nation’s life and health. The term “ethnopluralism” has been coined by the new right to advocate respect for cultural and ethnic differences while maintaining that the best strategy to protect them is to avoid their mixing with each other. Ethnopluralism, as defined by the new radical right, stands for the protection of national culture and identity while arguing that the national culture and identities of immigrants should also be preserved. In pragmatically, different cultures and identities should not be mixed because it is in the mixing that culture and identity are weakened, levelled down and eventually destroyed.
Rise of far right in Europe
It has been noted (Knigge, 1998: 255) that Generally, ‘extremist movements are movements of disaffection’ (Lipset & Raab 1978: 428). They appeal to people who are dissatis¬?ed with the status quo and who feel threatened by ongoing changes in society. These changes however, are complex and related to economic, political and social developments alike (Stoss 1991). Therefore, the rise of far right in Europe especially since 1980s can considered to be the result of the dissatisfaction of the changes which cause by Globalization.
The Evolution of Extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe
The rise of right-wing extremist parties in Europe have come in the wave. According to Widfeldt’s interpretation of research conducted by Klaus von Beyne’, the German political scientist, far-right can be divided into three phases (Widefeldt, 2010). The first phase started from the end of Second World War to the mid 1950s. During the first phase, the support for extreme right-wing parties had marginal because people still feared the influence of Fascism and Nazism. Therefore, the political parties which supported on far-right was excluded outside the political area even the German Sozialistische Reichsoartei, the successor of Nazi. At that time, there were only the Italian Movimento Sociale Italiano, the successor of Mussolini fascists, which continually took a seat in national parliament. After the mid 1950s, the second phase started. Far right political parties gradually represent in parliament with the new pattern — in the past far right political parties had an ideology on Nazism and Fascism but after mid 1950s they changed to against Post-war economic and modernization process, for example. Since the 1980s, the third phase have begun. Due to the process of globalization, many European countries have experienced the overwhelming of immigration. Simultaneously with the economic recession of those countries, some citizens not only have seen foreign workers as the cause of unemployment and the status decline of Native Europe but also the cause of disappearance of homogeneous culture. Therefore, several political parties in Europe have perceived this weakness and support “anti-immigration” as new form of ideology and campaign. As a result, several far right political parties have been increased in their electoral supports and can gain political participation in Parliament.
The Evolution of Extreme right-wing parties in Eastern Europe
Regarding to Eastern Europe, the extreme right wing parties has been established after the end of Cold war. Even though the characters of social and politics in the former Communist regime like Eastern Europe suit with nationalist extremist, the increase of right-wing political parties are still low in Eastern Europe. A recent study (Mudde, 2012) has described that there are only four political parties which have largest share of support in parliament includes Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Greater Romania Party, Serbian Radical Party and finally Hungarian Movement for a Better Hungary. Besides these four political parties, other political parties in Eastern Europe seems too small, no electoral support from citizens to be the representative in parliament. Even though extreme-right parties in Eastern Europe are unsuccessful, most operations from extreme right-wing are outside of the political arena. For example, In Eastern Europe, especially Russia and Serbia, the extreme right skin head gang and neo-Nazi group spread across Eastern Europe.
The rise of electoral vote of far-right parties after financial crisis
The global financial crisis in 2008 bring up the far-right parties across Europe in terms of citizens expressing their dissatisfaction of mainstream government. In other words, European citizens has perceived the mismanagement of the economic crisis by their own government which leads to decrease in GDP growth and increase in unemployment rate. Therefore, citizens have lost confident in their own governments and show more preference in far-right parties which in that time far-right parties try to exploit the situation by accusing a scapegoating such as foreign workers or immigrant for the cause of unemployment and the status decline of Native Europe. Even though the ideology and campaign of far right parties are various in different states depending on national histories and traditions, all of these political parties have mainly focused on anti-immigration, anti- multiculturalism and Islamophobia. Since 2008 global financial crisis, far-right political parties have gained a share of support in national parliaments across Europe especially in Norway, France, Hungary, Netherlands, England, Austria, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and finally Switzerland. Besides the national parliament, it was reported (BBC NEWS, 2009) that far-right political parties gained more seat in the 2009 European Parliament Election compared to the 2004 European Election and central-right political parties slightly drop in gaining the seat from 282 seats in 2004 to 264 seats in 2009. However, the central right political parties, namely European People’s Party, still be the largest group in European Parliament. In other words, they gained 264 out of the 736 seats and prevailed over European Socialists Parties and Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe which both two parties gained 183 and 84 seats, respectively. Regarding to the far-right parties, called Union for Europe of the Nations, the group’s members believe in national sovereignty and opponents of European integration. This group gained more seats from 23 in 2004 to 28 in 2009. The result of European Election in 2009 is meaningful to the rise of far right in Europe because its winning in election implies that far-right parties achieve in build mass organizations on the ground resulting to the power in broadcast their ideologies and the effective implementation of their own policies.
The eletoral impacts of globalisation
The emergence and notable growth of the new far right has occurred with significant increases in international integration, post-industrialisation and the rise of post-materialist values and policy orientations. There is a relationship between a major feature of contemporary structural change, globalisation, and electoral success of new far-right parties. Elections have served as important markers of far-right success and failure. Often, landmark breakthroughs by far-right parties have put them on the map for wider audiences. Direct elections to the European Parliament, too, have provided useful occasions for far-right parties to make their mark.
Theory and research on the economic impacts of globalisation stress that transnationally mobile manufacturing and financial enterprises as well as highly skilled professionals, technical personnel and managers are the ‘winners’ of internationalisation (Rodrik, 1997). Globalisation of markets, however, generates losses and new economic insecurities for some occupational strata and sectors. Specifically, Heckscher-Ohlin/Stolper-Samuelson models predict that semi- and unskilled workers bear significant costs of the globalisation of developed economies. That is, models of factor-price convergence suggest that the relative prices commanded by comparatively scarce factors in the developed economies (semi- and unskilled workers) decline with internationalisation as the relative demand for comparatively abundant factors (highly skilled workers) increases. Together, trade, capital mobility and immigration of workers may contribute to the decline in the relative wages and employment of increasing numbers of lower-skilled workers. In addition, the traditional middle class may be economically disadvantaged as well as facing threats to traditional institutions, values and status.
Overall, the evidence suggests that internationalisation is associated with modest declines in demand for lower-skilled workers and some increase in economic uncertainties as well as attendant threats to the social status, values and institutions of affected groups. Nevertheless, despite the absence of a dominant role for globalisation, international integration should contribute to the inclination of some voters to support parties that oppose international liberalisation and offer clear programmatic solutions to associated problems; this seems particularly likely if perceptions of burdens exceed actual costs of globalisation.
Perceptions and Politics
A.M.Mayda and D.Rodrik draw conclusions for the developed democracies as a whole from their analysis of International Social Survey Program and World Values Survey data. They conclude that a majority of citizens in the typical developed democracy supports restricting trade and that these protectionist attitudes vary systematically with education and occupational levels. Mayda and Rodrik find that in developed democracies where human capital is abundant, workers with higher education and occupational attainments are more likely to support free trade. Generally, the tangible effects of international integration on significant socio-economic groups, the likely tendency of citizens to weigh costs of globalisation more heavily than benefits and the widespread support among mainstream parties have offered an electoral opportunity for Radical Right Wing parties. These parties have commonly targeted electoral appeals to those who face economic uncertainties if not losses in the wake of globalisation and domestic change and to those who possess diffuse anxieties, fears and resentments in the wake of structural changes. Specifically, right-wing parties, while supporting free markets and liberalisation domestically, have systematically criticized international openness.
As the national economy moves towards global concerns in seeking foreign investments, invariably other aspects of domestic policy are affected. Capital moves to where it finds the most attractive home, thus seeking low-tax economies which places pressure on national macro-economic policy as the states’ tax-raising capacity is reduced by the tendency towards attracting investment. This weakens the states’ capacity to provide public services, fostering dissatisfaction among the citizen and reducing national cohesion (Day & Thompson, 2004: 175). Furthermore, a general shift in focus of national policy to cultural and identity issues could serve to favour the far right.
While politics at elite level concerns transnational and international matter, for the citizen, local and domestic affairs are still to the fore. Moreover, mass publics in all likelihood tend to weigh the costs of globalisation more heavily than benefits. In sum, theory and evidence suggest that globalisation modestly affects the demand for lower-skilled workers and may contribute to insecurities of employment and income for many wage earners. Duane Swank and Hans-Georg Betz conclude that international integration, or the notable increases in transnational flows of trade, capital and people in recent decades, has contributed to the electoral success of new far-right parties in Western Europe. The magnitude and nature of globalisation’s effects, however, are significantly shaped by national welfare state structures. Where national systems of social protection are comprehensive, generous and employment-orientated, rises in trade openness and capital mobility do not contribute to support for right-wing parties; where welfare programmatic structure is occupationally based or liberal in character, increases in transnational market flows are associated with moderate shifts in support to the new far right.
The role of the media
The far right discourse’s resonance depends on the intermediating role played by the media (including social media). Far-right parties and spokespeople have a particular media attraction because they can successfully represent themselves as new political kids on the block and can press their core issues of ‘immigration’ and ‘Islam’, all too readily reported and sensationalised as “alien” to the host society. In addition, popular media places the spotlight on the “charismatic” party leader with a populist message, rather than on more unassuming and collegiate figures. That is because the media lower the barriers of entry into the electoral market by giving new parties the means to disseminate their message across a wider audience than their organisational or financial resources would allow.
The far right has also sought to bypass the conventional media by using the internet to that effect. Through online behavior, Bartlett, Birdwell and Littler (2011) suggest that the emergence of populist parties and movements which often described as far right comes from 3 different sets of grievances that motivate citizens: economic grievances, disillusionment grievances and immigration grievances.
The economic explanation of populism contends that economic frustration is the prime motivator of populists. This view has two components: first, that most supporters of parties and movements are blue-collar workers or the “victims” of globalisation and outsourcing, and second, that these workers are motivated to join by financial concerns.
The second set of grievances concerns voters’ disillusionment with prevailing political parties and institutions. One argument advanced by scholars is that this disenchantment has led citizens to vote for populist political parties or join street groups out of protest. According to this ‘protest vote’ model, supporters of populist parties are not necessarily ideologically committed but support them to vent frustration.
The final category of grievances concerns immigration. Some studies have demonstrated that concern, worry or antipathy toward immigrants is the feature that unifies populist groups. Much of the academic literature suggested that a large degree of concern relating to immigration was economic in nature, however, more recent research suggests that immigration is seen as a threat to cultural identity. As highlighted by Matthew Goodwin’s recent report, “Right Response”, which is an increasingly favoured view.
Since the end of World War II, immigration has become one of the most divisive issues on the political agendas of Western democracies. Many individuals in European democracies express unease or out-right concern with the potential effects of migration on their countries, while others in these same countries are less uneasy or even welcoming toward newcomers. Left-right self-placement is likely to capture the potential ideological confluence between political dissatisfaction and hostility to immigration, with those on the far right expected to be more negative about political institutions and politicians and about immigration. Those who actually voted for the far right are, of course, very likely to be hostile to immigration and to politics because of ideas stoked by far-right party rhetoric. In the past ten years, and particularly since 2007 with the worldwide financial crisis, the sense of “Europeanness” has seemed to lessen (see Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). Immigration, the so-called “war on terror,” slow economic growth, and finally the financial crisis have caused citizens across Europe to view their national governments as the main focus of their identities and political activity (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). The rise of anti-immigrant, nationalist parties has been pronounced in Scandinavian countries, typically seen as bastions of leftwing and liberal social policy. Indeed, the terrorist attacks in Norway in 2011 have led to a good deal of introspection about the rise of ‘far right’ anti-immigrant groups, largely as Anders Breivik, the Norwegian terrorist, was a member of the Norwegian Progress Party before becoming disillusioned with their moderate approach.
A Case Study of Oslo’s Massacre
The most recent well known Far Right movement that caused a horrible shock to people of the entire world is The Oslo’s Massacre in 2011 which killed 77 people. A massive blast shook the centre of Oslo in the afternoon on Friday 22 July 2011, blowing out the windows of the prime minister’s offices and damaging the finance and oil ministries.Rubble and glass littered the streets and smoke from the fires drifted across the city from the devastated area – the heart of the Labour Party government. Witnesses described the scene as like a war zone. Police set up cordons and evacuated buildings while ambulances took dozens of injured people to hospital. Police confirmed the next day that the blast was caused by a car bomb, and that undetonated explosives remained in the area. The bomb contained an estimated 950kg (2,090lbs) of explosives made of fertilizer, 8 people were killed in this incident.
In the late afternoon, a ferryman was asked to transport a policeman to the island of Utoeya, located in a lake about 35km (20 miles) north-west of Oslo. The uniformed man was said to have been armed with a pistol and an automatic rifle. He had described how he was there to “do research in connection with the bomb blasts” But the policeman turned out to be a gunman, and he went on to shoot and kill many of young people staying at the island camp.
About 30 minutes later, a specialist police SWAT team was despatched from Oslo to Utoeya. Meanwhile, the gunman continued his killing spree undisturbed, randomly shooting victims, according to eyewitness reports. Survivors described chaotic scenes as teenagers fled from the gunman, some plunging into the water to swim to safety. He shot at those who tried to swim away. Others hid in the undergrowth, cowering in fear. The gunman was described as tall, blond and Nordic-looking – had called campers to him as if to offer help, only to open fire on them.
Officers eventually arrived on the island, Haarvard Gaasbakk, the leader of the first police squad to arrive on the island, said a group of youngsters directed them towards the gunman.”We then spotted the gunman shooting on the southern part of the island and we hear a lot of shooting – the gunshots are coming fast and thick,” he said. As the officers ran into a clearing in the forest, they suddenly came face to face with the gunman, hands above his head and his weapons 15m away on the ground. Mr. Gaasbakk said the gunman was arrested and one officer took charge of him while the others ran to give the victims first aid. The shooting spree had lasted more than an hour. Officers have said he still had “a considerable amount” of ammunition for both his guns – a pistol and an automatic rifle – when he surrendered. Hospital sources said the gunman had used dum-dum bullets, designed to disintegrate inside the body and cause maximum internal damage.
A Norwegian court has found that mass killer Anders Behring Breivik is sane and sentenced him to 21 years in jail. Breivik, who admitted killing 77 people when he bombed central Oslo and then opened fire at an island youth camp, told the court he would not appeal. He insisted he was sane and refused to plead guilty, saying last year’s attacks were necessary to stop the “Islamisation” of Norway. Afterwards Breivik said he did not recognise the court, which he contended had “sided with the multicultural majority in parliament”, but said he would not appeal as this would legitimise the proceedings. He accused the governing Labour Party of promoting multiculturalism and endangering Norway’s identity. In the pre-trial hearing, February 2012, Breivik read a prepared statement demanding to be released and treated as a hero for his “pre-emptive attack against traitors” accused of planning cultural genocide. He said, “They are committing, or planning to commit, cultural destruction, of which deconstruction of the Norwegian ethnic group and deconstruction of Norwegian culture. This is the same as ethnic cleansing.”
Experts in far-right ideology told the trial Breivik’s ideas should not be seen as the ramblings of a madman and Breivik’s attacks ignited a debate about the nature of tolerance and democracy in Norway. Anders Behring Breivik is a right-wing extremist and now regarded by many as a Christian fundamentalist, extremist, and terrorist. He claims he has a mentor and refers to him as Richard the Lionheart. He claims that he is a member of an international Christian military order based on the Knights Templar which was established in London in 2002 by nine individuals with a large number of “knights” and even bigger number of “civilians” including a number of cells in Europe. He was a member of a local Masonic lodge and was a proud freemason and he also claims he has contacts with the EDL and as his mentor’s codename is Richard the Lionheart it seems to suggest the EDL is very influential on him and his political views.
His main political goal was to stop as he refers to it, the “Islamification of Western EuropeaˆY. He claims he killed nearly eight people, who were in the majority non-Muslims, in order to save Europe from a “Muslim takeover”. Mario Borghezio, for instance who belongs to the anti-immigration Northern League party in Italy, which is a partner in Italy’s government coalition, condemned Breivik’s attacks, but supported his position against Muslim immigration to Europe. He was reported to have said, “Some of the ideas he expressed are good, barring the violence. Some of them are great.” Following his apprehension, Breivik was characterised by analysts as being a right-wing extremist with anti-Muslim views and a hatred of Islam, who considered himself a knight dedicated to stemming the tide of Muslim immigration into Europe. He was at first described by many in the media as a Christian fundamentalist, Christian terrorist, nationalist and right-wing extremist.
The rise of new far-right ideology in Europe both as in politics and as movements could be considered a